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ELICITING RISK PREFERENCES USING CHOICE LISTS
DAVID J. FREEMAN, YORAM HALEVY AND TERRI KNEELAND
Abstract. We study the effect of embedding pairwise choices between lotteries
within a choice list on measured risk attitude. Using an experiment with online
workers, we find that subjects choose the risky lottery rather than a sure payment
significantly more often when responding to a choice list. This behavior can be ra-
tionalized by the interaction between non-expected utility and the random incentive
system, as suggested by Karni and Safra (1987).
Keywords: random incentive system, isolation, independence axiom, multiple price list, reduction of
compound lotteries, preference reversals, certainty effect.
1. Introduction
A preference relation is, by definition, a binary relation over alternatives. As such,
the “gold standard” for revealing preferences through choice is the observation of a
single pairwise choice. However, such an experiment provides very limited information
about individual preferences – for example, it cannot reveal a lottery’s certainty
equivalent. To elicit finer information about preferences, a common experimental
practice presents a subject with a sequence of related pairwise choices arranged in
a list, known as a Choice List (or Multiple Price List). A randomization device is
used to pick one decision to determine the subject’s payment, a procedure known
as the Random Incentive System (RIS). In recent years, choice lists have become
the workhorse method in experimental economics to measure individual preferences.
Usually, each pairwise choice a subject makes in a list is interpreted as if she had faced
only a single pairwise choice (Bardsley, Cubitt, and Loomes, 2009, pages 272-273).
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This paper investigates whether subjects’ choices between lotteries are influenced
by whether or not they are embedded in a choice list. In one group of treatments,
subjects respond to one or two choice lists. In a second group of treatments, subjects
make a single (or two) pairwise choice(s); each such choice corresponds exactly to a
single line of the corresponding choice list.
We find that embedding a pairwise choice in a choice list increases the fraction of
subjects choosing the riskier lottery from 23% to 45% when the safer alternative is
certain (p < .001), but does not significantly affect choices when the safer alternative
is risky (p = .17). This suggests that embedding choices in a list can affect subjects’
responses, especially when comparing sure outcomes to risky lotteries.
Our findings suggest an interaction between the choice list and subjects’ risk pref-
erences. Experiments have consistently shown that decision makers tend to be partic-
ularly averse to risk when a riskless option is available, compared to situations where
certainty is absent – the so-called certainty effect (Allais, 1953).1 Since in expected
utility risk aversion is captured solely by the curvature of the utility function over
payments, this behavior can only be accomodated by non-expected models. We con-
jecture that the list presentation induces subjects to account for the risk generated by
the RIS, eliminating the “certainty” attribute from a riskless alternative, and thereby
affects their choices in the experiment. Below, we provide a simplified example that
demonstrates how this approach can account for our findings.
Our work includes a practical recommendation for experimentalists who would like
to continue to use the more precise information contained in choice lists. We believe
that the between-subject design employed in the current study, in which a control
group of subjects who make a single pairwise choice is used to test for systematic
bias in the choice list, could and should be easily incorporated in future studies –
particularly for studies involving choices between risky and riskless alternatives.
How Non-Expected Utility Rationalizes our Results. Consider a subject with the fol-
lowing preferences over lotteries. She prefers receiving $3 for sure to the lottery that
has an 80% chance of paying $4 and zero otherwise, but prefers $4 if it is paid with
probability of 90%; denote this preference by ($4, .9)  ($3, 1)  ($4, .8). However,
she also prefers the lottery where she receives $4 with a 40% chance to the lottery
where she receives $3 with a 50% chance, denoted by ($4, .4)  ($3, .5). These prefer-
ences exhibit the certainty effect (as the probabilities in the latter pair of lotteries are
1See Section 6 in Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger, and Ortoleva (2015) for a recent discussion of this
evidence.
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exactly half of the first pair), so they violate the independence axiom by exhibiting
a greater preference for a safer option when it is riskless. If this subject faces an
experiment where she makes a single choice between ($4, .8) and ($3, 1), she would
choose the safer option – ($3, 1). If instead she faces an experiment where she makes
a single choice between ($4, .4) and ($3, .5), she would choose the riskier option –
($4, .4).
Now consider an experiment in which this subject is asked to make two choices,
displayed in a list and incentivized using the RIS, so one line will be chosen at random
for payment. In line 1 of the list, the subject chooses between ($3, 1) and ($4, .9),
while in line 2 of the list the subject chooses between ($3, 1) and ($4, .8).
Suppose the subject chooses ($4, .9) over ($3, 1) in line 1 of the list, according to
her original preference. Then, she has at least a 5% chance of making $0 in the
experiment, since there is a 50% chance that her choice in line 1 will be selected by
the RIS to determine her payment. The choice list makes apparent to the subject that
choosing ($3, 1) in line 2 of the list would not guarantee a sure prize. As line 2 has
no truly certain option now, the certainty effect evident in her underlying preference
($3, 1)  ($4, .8) is no longer at play, making the riskier option ($4, .8) more attractive
when embedded in the list. Thus, the certainty effect can lead to different behaviors
in this experiment as compared to an experiment with only a single choice.
But now consider how the subject would instead behave in a second list, involving
choices away from certainty, where the above winning probabilities are halved for all
options. In line 1 of this list, the subject chooses between ($3, .5) and ($4, .45), while
in line 2 of this list the subject chooses between ($3, .5) and ($4, .4). In this list, all
options in both lines are risky. The RIS and the subject’s choice in line 1 changes the
risk faced by the subject in line 2, but does not alter the fact that line 2 is a choice
between two risky options. Similar to the first list, the subject’s choices in line 2 may
not reveal her true preference, but unlike the first list, we have no strong reason to
believe that the RIS will systematically bias subjects’ choices in either direction.
The above example shows that when a subject makes a single choice, certainty is
certainty. But when the subject makes more than one choice under the RIS and the
subject takes this into account, choosing a sure option in one question may no longer
give the subject certainty, and thus the certainty effect will not affect decisions. We
believe that the list presentation makes the presence of many choices and the RIS
particularly evident to subjects, making subjects particularly likely to account for
them when making decisions. In Section 4, we show that leading models of the
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certainty effect, including cautious expected utility (Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger,
and Ortoleva, 2015), can be applied to model the results of our experiment.
Related Literature. Experimental economists have long been concerned with the con-
ditions under which a mechanism for eliciting preferences is incentive compatible –
that is, the ranking between any two alternatives inferred from the mechanism coin-
cide with how the subject would choose between these alternatives if she faced a single
pairwise choice. By definition, an experiment with a single pairwise choice is incen-
tive compatible and reveals underlying preferences. Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
(BDM, 1964) proposed a convenient method for measuring the valuation of an alter-
native by asking a subject to match an alternative to a value (a “matching” task).
The BDM mechanism is incentive compatible if subjects’ preferences satisfy a ver-
sion of the independence axiom.2 The “preference reversal” literature demonstrated
that BDM-elicited valuations can be systematically inconsistent with subjects’ pair-
wise choices among lotteries (Grether and Plott, 1979). The psychology literature
has suggested that since subjects respond by stating a number (rather than making a
pairwise choice), this response mode might lead to differences in behavior as compared
to choice tasks (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971), independently of incentives. Alterna-
tively, theoretical work by Karni and Safra (1987) and Segal (1988) suggested that in
incentivized experiments, failure of a version of the independence axiom may ratio-
nalize the systematic inconsistencies between BDM-elicited valuations and pairwise
choices.3
Meanwhile, the experimental economics literature (confronted with the challenges
involving the BDM in other domains) opted to use choice lists (e.g. Cohen, Jaf-
fray, and Said (1987); Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2006)), which have
become the workhorse method of experimental economists studying individual pref-
erences. Choice lists are a discrete implementation of the BDM through a sequence
of related pairwise choices.4 It has been pointed out that such a design will be incen-
tive compatible under Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) “isolation hypothesis” - the
hypothesis that a subject, when making multiple decisions, makes each decision as if
2The original BDM mechanism asked subjects to report a monetary valuation. A variation of the
BDM where subjects report by matching a probability was used by Grether (1981) and studied by
Karni (2009).
3Holt (1986) pointed out that when the independence axiom is not satisfied, subjects may respond
differently to a single matching task (BDM) and to few matching tasks incentivized by the RIS.
4A choice list with varying probabilities, like the one used in the present study, was first used
(without incentives) by Davidson, Suppes, and Siegel (1957), revisited by McCord and De Neufville
(1986), and was revisited (with the RIS) by Sprenger (2015).
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she faced that decision in isolation. Starmer and Sugden (1991) and Cubitt, Starmer,
and Sugden (1998) studied the incentive compatibility of RIS in experiments where
a subject makes a small number of pairwise choices, but could not statistically reject
incentive compatibility. More recently, Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2014; 2015) use
comparable designs to Starmer and Sugden but find evidence against the incentive
compatibility of RIS (we discuss these studies in greater detail in Section 4.3), as do
Harrison and Swarthout (2014), who compare subjects who make a single choice to
subjects who make a large number of choices.
None of the aforementioned experimental studies of incentive compatibility use
choice lists. Moreover, the earlier experimental papers that support incentive com-
patibility when subjects make a small number of pairwise choices have been taken
to justify the use of choice lists. For example, Bardsley, Cubitt, and Loomes (2009,
pages 272-273) conclude that since a choice list is basically a sequence of pairwise
choices, individuals will approach them in this way (i.e. isolate), unlike BDM - in
which the response mode is different (i.e. subjects are asked to state a numerical
valuation rather than make a direct choice). This justification ignores the existing
theoretical analysis (Karni and Safra, 1987; Segal, 1988) of the BDM mechanism,
which is based on incentives and not on response mode, and applies equally to choice
lists. Our results point to the empirical relevance of these theoretical critiques for
experiments that use choice lists.
2. Experimental design
We recruited 571 subjects by posting a task to the mTurk online labor market
from September 2011 to July 2012.5 Participants were paid $1 for completing the
experiment, and up to $4 as a ‘bonus’ based on their choices and an element of
chance. The experiment took at most 15 minutes to complete and the potential bonus
payments of $3 or $4 provided high incentives for this subject pool. In Appendix ??
we discuss mTurk as a subject pool for economic experiments.
The experiment consisted of sixteen different treatments. Our main treatment
variation was between “pairwise choice” treatments in which a subject faced one or
two pairwise choice tasks, and “choice list” treatments in which a subject faces one
or two choice list tasks. We also incorporated secondary treatment variation in the
number of choice tasks, their order, and the payment mechanism. Throughout the
5The full details of the experimental procedure are described in Appendix ??.
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Table 1. The list tasks
List 1 List 2
Line Option A Option B Option A Option B
1 ($3, 1) ($4, 1) ($3, .5) ($4, .50)












26 ($3, 1) ($4, .50) ($3, .5) ($4, .25)
study, we employed a between-subject design in which each subject was randomly
assigned to one of the treatments.
In “pairwise choice” treatments (denoted by P), each subject faced either a sin-
gle or two pairwise choice tasks. In Q1 the subject had to choose between ($3, 1)
and ($4, .80), and in Q2 the subject chose between ($3, .50) and ($4, .40). In “one
task” treatments (P1 and P2), subjects made only a single pairwise choice and were
paid based on their choice. Subjects in P1 responded to Q1, while subjects in P2
responded to Q2. In the “two tasks” treatments (P12 and P21) subjects made two
pairwise choices, displayed on separate screens, one of which was randomly selected
to determine payment at the end of the experiment. Subjects in P12 made a choice
in Q1 and then in Q2, while the order was reversed in the P21 group.
In “choice list” treatments, each task consisted of a list of pairwise choices in which
the left hand side lottery (“Option A”) was held constant throughout the list while
the probability of winning the higher prize in the right hand side lottery (“Option
B”) decreased as subjects proceeded down the list. Table 1 presents the two choice
list tasks employed in the list treatments. Line 11 in List 1 is exactly the pairwise
choice Q1, while line 11 of List 2 corresponds to the pairwise choice Q2. In “one task”
treatments subjects responded to a single choice list, while in the the “two tasks”
treatments subjects responded to both choice lists. Subjects were informed that if
a list task determines their payment, one line from that list would be selected to
determine their bonus. We allowed subjects to switch from Option A to Option B at
any number of points on the list, but used a pop-up to warn subjects who switched
from Option B to Option A and then back to Option B.
In the standard list treatments (denoted by L), subjects faced the list(s) shown
in Table 1 immediately after the instructions. In the separate screens treatments
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Table 2. Treatments and treatment labels
One Task Two Tasks (Order)
Q1 (1) Q2 (2) Q1, Q2 (12) Q2, Q1 (21)
Pairwise choice (P) 39 41 20 22
Lists
Pay One
47 (43) 45 (41)
36 (27) 35 (29)Standard List (O)
List (L) Pay Both 36 (31) 33 (26)Lists (A)
Separate Pay One
48 (46) 49 (48)
37 (36) 32 (29)Screens List (O)
then List Pay Both 26 (25) 25 (25)(S) Lists (A)
Entries indicate the number of subjects and, for L and S treatments, the number of
subjects who exhibit single-switching in brackets (where applicable)
(denoted by S), before completing each list, subjects responded to a sequence of (non-
incentivized) pairwise choices that appeared on separate screens. These hypothetical
pairwise choice tasks were presented so as to converge towards the switching point
in the list for a subject with monotone preferences. Subjects then responded to an
incentivized list that was already filled in using their responses to the pairwise choice
tasks but was otherwise identical to that in the corresponding L treatment. Crucially,
subjects in the S treatment were free to change their answers in the (incentivized)
list. Among subjects in list treatments, we varied whether subjects responded only
to a single list (as in L1, L2, S1, and S2)6 or to two lists (as in all treatments ending
with 12 or 21). For subjects who responded to two lists, we varied the order of the
tasks (denoted by 12 vs. 21) and whether a subject’s bonus payment was determined
by one pairwise choice randomly picked from the two lists (O treatments), or two
pairwise choices with one randomly picked from each list (A treatments).
Table 2 outlines the treatments described above, and notes the number of subjects
in each treatment.
3. Findings
3.1. Main results: choice lists versus pairwise choice. Figure 1 compares, for
Q1 and Q2, the distribution of choices in the pairwise choice treatments to those
made on line 11 in the list treatments. In Q1 only 23% of subjects in the pairwise
choice treatments chose the risky (B) option, but 45% of subjects in the choice list
6Subjects in L1 and S1 responded to List 1, while subjects in L2 and S2 responded to List 2.
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treatments chose this option, a significant difference (p < .001, Fisher’s exact test).
In Q2, 30% of subjects chose lottery B in the pairwise choice treatments, and 38%
chose this lottery in the choice list treatments, a difference that is not statistically
significant (p = .17, Fisher’s exact test). This is our main finding - embedding a
pairwise choice in a choice list increases the fraction of subjects choosing the riskier
lottery when the safer alternative is certain but does not significantly affect choices
when the safer alternative is risky.
Figure 1. The fraction of subjects choosing the riskier option B in Q1
and Q2. Under the Q1 heading, “Pairwise Choice” groups include P1,
P12, and P21, and “Choice List, Line 11” groups include L1, S1, and
all LO, LA, SO, and SA treatments. Under the Q2 heading, “Pairwise
Choice” groups include P2, P12, and P21, and “Choice List, Line 11”
groups include L2, S2, and all LO, LA, SO, and SA treatments. 95%
confidence intervals shown.
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3.2. Direct tests of the independence axiom. In Section 4 we model our main
findings as stemming from the interaction of choice list presentation and the failure
of the independence axiom around certainty. One relevant question then is whether
the certainty effect is detected directly in our data.
First, consider pairwise choice. The single pairwise choice treatments (P1 and P2)
are incentive compatible by definition, and we could not statistically reject incentive
compatibility of the two pairwise choice treatments (P12 and P21, see subsection 3.3).
However, since these two questions only look at very particular lotteries, we cannot
view a failure to reject the independence axiom as providing strong evidence in its
favor. We find that aggregate choices exhibit a slight common ratio effect – 23% of
subjects who faced Q1 choose the riskier option, as compared to 30% in Q2. These
violations of the independence axiom are not significant (p = .80 for a Fisher’s exact
test for P1 vs P2, p = .38 when pooling all of the pairwise choice treatments). At
the individual level (relying only on the 42 subjects who responded to P12 and P21),
pairwise choice data only detects violations of the independence axiom (AB and BA
choice patterns) for 29% of subjects, with 19% of subjects exhibiting the certainty
effect.7 We note that the 19% of subjects who exhibit the certainty effect is on the
same order of magnitude as the observed 22 percentage point difference in proportions
of risky choices in Q1 between pairwise choice treatments and list treatments.
Second, consider behavior in the list and separate screens treatments. If our L
and S treatments had been incentive compatible, then we could interpret each choice
as indicating a subject’s preference and comparing responses in the two tasks would
enable us to test the independence axiom. We rejected incentive compatibility of List
1 in section 3.1, and now we ask what conclusions we would draw if we set aside
that finding and erroneously interpreted subjects’ responses in each list as directly
measuring their preferences. We find that aggregate responses are close to expected
utility with choices exhibiting a slight reverse common ratio effect. Pooling all the
list treatments and ignoring the within-subject nature of part of the treatments,
the median switching points (for single-switching subjects) in the choice lists are
consistent with the following ranking: ($4, .86)  ($3, 1)  ($4, .84) and ($4, .44) 
($3, .5)  ($4, .43), which is inconsistent with the independence axiom in the reverse
direction of the standard common-ratio effect. This violation of the independence
axiom is quantitatively small and is statistically significant at 5% (p = .02, rank-sum
7However, due to small sample size, we cannot reject that the direction of the deviation from the
independence axiom is symmetric (p = .39, McNemar’s test).
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Table 3. Behavior relative to the independence axiom: within-subject
Common Ratio Independence Reverse Common
Ratio
Choice List (L and
S)a
33.3% 21.5% 45.2%
Choice List (L and
S), line 11b
11.4% 68.0% 20.6%
Pairwise Choice (P)c 19.1% 71.4% 9.5%
a percentage of single-switching subjects who switched earlier to lottery A in Q1 than in Q2
(common ratio), switched on the same line in Q1 and Q2 (independence), or switched on an
earlier line to lottery A in Q2 than in Q1(reverse common ratio).
b percentage of single-switching subjects who answered both Q1 and Q2 and: chose lottery A in
Q1 and lottery B in Q2 on line 11 (common ratio), made similar choices on line 11 (AA or BB,
independence), chose B in Q1 and A in Q2 on line 11.
c percentage of subjects in the P12 and P21 treatments, who chose A in Q1 and B in Q2 (common
ratio), made similar choice in Q1 and Q2 (independence), chose B in Q1 and A in Q2 (reverse
common ratio).
test). At the individual level we detect violations of the independence axiom for
78.5% of single-switching subjects, split between standard common ratio and reverse
common ratio violations with the latter being slightly more frequent (Table 3), but
this difference is statistically insignificant at 5% (p = .052, sign test).8
3.3. Differences across treatments. Our experiment had numerous different
choice list treatments, yet the only significant treatment effect from our main com-
parisons is subjects’ greater willingness to take risks in Q1 of the list treatments as
compared to the pairwise choice treatments. We report tests for other treatment
effects for completeness.
We test whether subjects respond differently depending on whether they are in the
“one task” or “two tasks” treatments. In pairwise choice treatments we find that of the
subjects who face only one choice, 23% choose the risky option in Q1 and 27% choose
the riskier option in Q2. In comparison, 24% of subjects who respond to both pairwise
choices on different screens choose the risky option in Q1, and 33% of them choose
the riskier option in Q2. These differences between the “one task” (P1/P2) and “two
tasks” (P12 and P21) pairwise choice treatments are statistically insignificant (p = .92
for Q1 and p = .53 for Q2, Fisher’s exact tests). This finding is consistent with the
literature supporting the incentive compatibility of the RIS in which subjects respond
8In a sign test one omits the zeroes to achieve the uniformly most powerful test. See Lehmann and
Romano (2005) page 136.
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Table 4. Display, payment mechanism and order effects in choice list
List 1 List 2
Separate screens effect (L=S) .94 .81
Order effect (12=21) .15 .05
Payment mechanism effect (O=A) .38 .77
p-values reported for a Wilcoxon rank-sum test of equality of distribution
Tests use only subjects who exhibit single-switching
to a small number of pairwise choices (Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Cubitt, Starmer,
and Sugden, 1998). We also do not find significant differences between switching
points in “one list” and “two lists” treatments (p = .21 for List 1, p = .91 for List 2,
rank-sum tests including all L and S subjects who choose B on line 1 and switch from
B to A at most once). While our choice lists may not be incentive compatible, we
can still test whether different variations on choice lists produce different behavior.
The 2x2x2 design embedded in the treatments ({L,S}×{O,A}×{12,21}) allows us to
separately test for the presence of display (separate screens), payment mechanism,
and order effects in each task. We find that only one of these effects (Table 4) is
marginally significant at 5% before, but not after, correcting for multiple hypothesis
testing by the Holm-Bonferroni method.
One interesting treatment effect that is not the focus of the current investigation,
is that the proportion of subjects who exhibit single-switching behavior is higher in
the separate screens (S) treatments than in the list (L) treatments (96% vs. 85%;
p < .001, Fisher’s exact test, see Table 2). As one might expect, there are relatively
more (94% vs. 88%; p = .02, Fisher’s exact test) single-switching subjects in the
treatments in which subjects faced only a single list (as opposed to two). Neither
order nor payment mechanism significantly affect the proportion of single-switching
subjects (p = .85, .57 respectively, Fisher’s exact tests).
We introduced the separate screens treatment later in our experimental investiga-
tion, hoping it would bridge the gap between standard choice list and pairwise choice
treatments. We conjectured that a combination of isolation in pairwise choices made
on different screens, a lack of influence of hypothetical versus real incentives, and a
creation of a default when the actual list was displayed, would eliminate the observed
differences in responses made in choice list versus pairwise choice treatments. Ta-
ble 4 shows that the incentivized choice data do not support this view. Moreover,
comparing the incentivized responses to line 11 in the separate screens treatments to
pairwise choices, we find a significant difference in Q1 (p < 0.001, Fisher’s exact test)
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and an insignificant difference in Q2 (p = 0.21, Fisher’s exact test), similar to the list
treatments.9
4. Theory: Pairwise choice versus choice lists
Faced with the experimental findings documented so far, this section demonstrates
they can be rationalized within existing theoretical models of non-expected utility
preferences. The theory provides the tools to evaluate the robustness of inference
from existing studies to the behavior documented here, and enables one to improve
future experimental designs.
There are two main empirical regularities that we want to account for by the models
we will consider. First, subjects are more risk averse when making a pairwise choice
involving certainty than when making the identical choice in a list. However, this
effect is not present in choices without a riskless option. Second, while there is strong
prior evidence of the certainty effect in experiments that study pairwise choices, we
do not detect this choice pattern when looking only at choices made in lists.
Consider a simple lottery p = (xi, pi)
n
i=1 paying xi with probability pi, where xi >
xi+1 for each i. A compound lottery pi = [pi, pii]
m
i=1 pays the simple one-stage lottery
pi with probability pii.10
A subject at line i in List 1 faces a pairwise choice between two lotteries ($3, 1)
(option A) and ($4, 1− 0.02 (i− 1)) (option B). Combining their choices in each of
the lines with the RIS creates a two-stage compound lottery. Specifically, a subject
with a single switching point who chooses option B for the last time at line i receives






; . . . ; ($4, 1.02− .02i) , 1
26




When applied to compound lotteries, the independence axiom can be separated
into two components (Segal, 1990): mixture independence that applies to lotteries
9We find that 29% of single-switching subjects who faced one list and 43% of single-switching subjects
who faced two lists in the S treatments amended at least one of their choices. They switched in
both directions, with 65% of switches involving a move from riskier-preliminary to safer-incentivized
choices. Looking only at line 11, the aggregate distribution of preliminary choices made in Q2 is
identical to the incentivized choices, and the preliminary choices in Q1 are slightly more risk-taking
(by 5 subjects) than the incentivized choices.
10We continue to write (x, p) to denote a lottery with only one possible non-zero outcome, but
include zero outcomes explicitly for lotteries with two or more non-zero outcomes.
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that resolve in a single stage, and compound independence for two-stage lotteries.11
Compound independence specifies that a subject facing the compound lottery in (1)
evaluates it recursively according to (2):
(2)
(
c (($4, 1)) ,
1
26
; . . . ; c (($4, 1.02− .02i)) , 1
26




where c (·) is a certainty equivalent function over one-stage lotteries. A subject who
satisfies compound independence will choose the risky option on line i (Option B)
whenever c (($4, 1.02− .02i)) > c(($3, 1)). Thus, she will make identical choices in
each line of the choice list as she would have made in an experiment in which she
only faced the single pairwise choice.12 This prediction is inconsistent with the main
finding of our experiment. It follows that any preferences that rationalize this finding
and exhibit the certainty effect must not only violate the (mixture) independence
axiom, but also compound independence.
We believe that the key observation in understanding our experimental findings is
that a subject who chooses the risky option (B) on the first few lines of List 1 does
not face a choice that involves certainty on line 11 of the choice list. In other words,
choosing the sure outcome (A) on line 11 does not lead to payment with certainty
since the RIS may select one of the first lines. This reduces the attractiveness of the
safe option for a subject sensitive to certainty.
We suggest modeling this behavior by assuming that the subject chooses her switch-
ing line in the choice list as if she reduces the compound lottery in (1) according to
the laws of probability (Reduction of Compound Lotteries Axiom, ROCL; Samuelson
11We can formally define both axioms following Segal (1990). A preference relation %1 over
single-stage lotteries satisfies mixture independence if, for any three lotteries p = (xi, pi)
n
i=1 , q =
(xi, qi)
n
i=1 , r = (xi, ri)
n
i=1 (written with common support, without loss of generality), p %1 q if and
only if for all λ ∈ (0, 1), we have (xi, (1− λ) pi + λri)ni=1 %1 (xi, (1− λ) qi + λri)ni=1. A preference
relation %2 over compound lotteries satisfies compound independence if, for any compound lotteries
pi =
[





p1, pi1; . . . ; r, pij ; . . . ; p
m, pim
]
, we have pi %2 pi′ if and
only if [q, 1] %2 [r, 1]. Any preference relation over compound lotteries induces two preference rela-
tions over single-stage lotteries: one from compound lotteries of the form [(xi, 1) , pii]
m
i=1 that resolve
entirely at the first stage, and another from compound lotteries of the form [p, 1] that resolve en-
tirely at the second stage. In our discussion, we implicitly assume that these two preference relations
coincide – an assumption that Segal calls time neutrality.
12We can make a broader statement: an experiment studying choice among lotteries and employing
the RIS is incentive compatible if and only if preferences over two-stage lotteries satisfy compound
independence. In particular, (2) places no restriction on c(·), and therefore can accommodate non-
expected utility preferences over one-stage lotteries.
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1952).13 In our view, the presentation of the choice list and instructions describing
the RIS make the incentive structure particularly transparent to subjects, making
such behavior more likely.
If one chooses option B for the last time on line i then reducing the compound













Hence, a subject who satisfies ROCL will choose the switching point to maximize her
utility of (3). Figure 2 displays the set of feasible lotteries that correspond to switching
points in both lists and the two pairwise choice problems. Our assumption of ROCL
follows the modeling approach suggested by Karni and Safra (1987) to account for
preference reversals between the valuations elicited through a BDM mechanism and
choice tasks. This modeling simplification captures the idea that there may exist an
interdependence between subject’s willingness to take the risky option at each specific
line of the list and her choices in other lines. This means that a subject will no longer
make decisions in each line of the choice list as she would have made in an experiment
in which she only faced the single pairwise choice, violating compound independence
and rendering the mechanism not incentive compatible.14
We show by way of examples that plausible specifications of preferences from the
non-expected utility literature can generate the type of behavior we observe in the
experiment. That is, we show that these preference specifications both (i) allow a sub-
ject who prefers a riskless option A over a risky option B in Q1 to nevertheless choose
the risky option when the choice is embedded in a list, while ruling out the opposite
reversal, and (ii) either predict no effect or do not restrict the effect of embedding Q2
in a choice list. We study cautious expected utility (Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger, and
13A preference relation%2 over compound lotteries satisfies ROCL if for every two compound lotteries
pi =
[























pi ∼2 pi′. Segal (1990, Theorem 2) shows that compound independence and ROCL imply mixture
independence, and mixture independence and ROCL imply compound independence.
14There exist evidence against ROCL as a descriptive axiom in other contexts (e.g. Halevy, 2007).
We view the ROCL as a convenient modeling simplification that is sufficient but not necessary. For
example, our arguments will go through, with appropriate modifications, if a person evaluates the
compound lottery in (1) by a weighted average of their utility evaluation of the recursively-obtained
lottery in (2) and their utility evaluation of the reduced lottery in (3) – so long as they put strictly
positive weight on the latter component.










A1= ($3, 1) A2= ($3, .5)
B2= ($4, .4)
Figure 2. The decision problem in a Marschak-Machina triangle. Each
point in the triangle represents a lottery over the outcomes $4, $3, and $0. Any
point on an edge of the triangle represents a lottery with only two possible outcomes,
and a straight line between any two points in the triangle represents all mixtures
(convex combinations) of the lotteries represented by these two points. The pairwise
choice in Q1 is between A1 and B1. Under ROCL, the choice of a switching point
in List 1 corresponds to a choice on the curve List1, such that an earlier switching
point corresponds to a point on List1 that is closer to A1. The slope of List1 at line
11 equals the slope of A1B1. Now consider an expected utility subject (satisfying
compound independence in addition to ROCL) who is indifferent between A1 and
B1. She will be indifferent between Option A and Option B on Line 11 of the choice
list, and therefore will switch on this line. Since her indifference curves are parallel
straight lines, it follows that she maximizes utility when her indifference curve are
tangent to List1, which occurs at the point corresponding to Line 11.
Ortoleva, 2015) and rank dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987) with the neo-
additive weighting function (Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant, 2007; Webb and
Zank, 2011). The former model generalizes expected utility to accommodate failure
of independence around certainty, while the latter weighting function transparently
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captures the certainty effect15 within the widely-used class of rank dependent utility
preferences.
4.1. Cautious expected utility. In this subsection, we apply cautious expected
utility to study behavior in our experiment assuming that likelihoods of final outcomes
are calculated according to the laws of probability (ROCL). We show that a subject
described by this model who chooses the safe option (A) in the pairwise choice Q1
may choose the risky option (B) on line 11 of List 1, but a subject who chooses the
risky option (B) in the pairwise choice Q1 must also do so on line 11 of List 1. The
model places no restrictions on the relationship between choices in the pairwise choice
Q2 and line 11 of List 2. As such, cautious expected utility is consistent with our two
main empirical regularities.
Suppose a subject’s preferences are represented by cautious expected util-











, where U is a set of expected utility functions from R+ → R.
Cerreia-Vioglio, Dillenberger, and Ortoleva (2015) show that the cautious expected
utility is characterized by the negative certainty independence (NCI; Dillenberger,
2010) axiom (in addition to continuity and weak payoff monotonicity). In our set-
ting, the NCI axiom implies that
(4) ($4, p) % ($3, 1) =⇒
λ ($4, p; $0, 1− p) (1− λ) ($4, `1; $3, `2; $0, 1− `1 − `2)
% λ ($3, 1) (1− λ) ($4, `1; $3, `2; $0, 1− `1 − `2)
for any `1, `2 ≥ 0 with `1+`2 ≤ 1 and any λ ∈ (0, 1) (where  is the mixture operator
defined by λ (xi, pi)i ⊕ (1− λ) (xi, qi)i = (xi, λpi + (1− λ) qi)i). This is equivalent to:
($4, λp+ (1− λ) `1; $3, (1− λ) `2; $0, 1− λp− (1− λ) `1 − (1− λ) `2)
% ($4, (1− λ) `1; $3, λ+ (1− λ) `2; $0, 1− (1− λ) `1 − λ− (1− λ) `2)
NCI has no implication for a subject who ranks ($3, 1) % ($4, .8), thus allowing the
reversal we observe between the pairwise choice Q1 and line 11 of List 1.
To show that NCI rules out the opposite choice pattern, we now consider a subject
who chooses the risky alternative in the pairwise choice Q1, and hence ranks ($4, .8) %
($3, 1). Monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance and transitivity
15Most other weighting functions accommodate the certainty effect, but also try to match other
nuances of choice patterns over risky prospects, which are of lesser interest here.
ELICITING RISK PREFERENCES USING CHOICE LISTS 17
imply that:
(5) ($4, 1− .02 (i− 1)) % ($3, 1) for i ≤ 11
which means that the subject prefers the risky option (B) to the sure outcome (A)
in pairwise choices that correspond to lines 1, . . . 11 of List 1. Note that for each line
i of List 1, the reduced one-stage lottery, corresponding to arbitrary choices on all
other lines and the risky or safe alternative on line i, can be written as a mixture of
($4, `i1; $3, `
i
2; $0, 1− `i1 − `i2) for some `i1, `i2 ≥ 0 for which `i1 + `i2 ≤ 1 (corresponding
to the lottery induced by choices on lines other than i), and ($4, 1− .02 (i− 1)) or




($4, 1− .02 (i− 1) ; $0, .02 (i− 1))⊕ 25
26
(
$4, `i1; $3, `
i







$4, `i1; $3, `
i
2; $0, 1− `i1 − `i2
)
Thus it follows that the subject will choose the risky option on line 11 and all preceding
lines. Thus we have shown that a subject who satisfies NCI and chooses ($4, .8) over
($3, 1) in a single pairwise choice would also choose ($4, .8) over ($3, 1) in line 11 of
List 1.
An alternative way to understand the implications of NCI in our setting is through
Figure 2. By Lemma 3 in Dillenberger (2010), NCI implies that a subject’s steepest
indifference curve must run through A1 and be linear. Thus the highest indifference
curve feasible on List1 (which determines her switching point in List1) must be flatter
than her indifference curve through A1. This creates the possibility that a subject
who chooses ($3, 1) over ($4, .8) in a pairwise choice would switch after line 11 in
the list – corresponding to a point on List1 to the right of the point representing
line 11. Thus, preferences that satisfy NCI can be consistent with our first empirical
regularity: choosing ($3, 1) over ($4, .8) in a pairwise choice and ($4, .8) on line 11 of
List1. At the same time, the opposite reversal is ruled out: a subject cannot choose
($4, .8) over ($3, 1) in a pairwise choice and ($3, 1) on line 11 of List 1.
Preferences that satisfy NCI are also consistent with our second empirical regular-
ity: no evidence of a certainty effect when studying choices from List 1 and 2. Given
information on a subject’s pairwise choice in Q1, NCI does not have any implication
for Q2, except that it is inconsistent with the combination of choosing ($3, .5) in Q2
and ($4, .8) in Q1. This is because a choice of ($4, .8) over ($3, 1) in a pairwise choice
would imply that the slope of the subject’s indifference curve through A1 is flatter
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than the line A1B1. NCI would then require that the slope of her indifference curve
through A2 be flatter than the line A2B2. Thus, cautious expected utility preferences
can be consistent with a subject using the same switching point in both List 1 and
List 2 - which would produce no evidence of a certainty effect when using choice lists.
4.2. Rank dependent utility. In this subsection, we apply the model of rank de-
pendent utility with the neo-additive weighting function to study behavior in List 1
and List 2 assuming that likelihoods of final outcomes are calculated according to
the laws of probability (ROCL). We show that a subject who would be indifferent
between the safe option (A) in the pairwise choice Q1 would choose the risky option
(B) on line 11 of List 1. Further, a subject must choose the same switching point in
List 1 and List 2. As such, rank dependent utility with the neo-additive weighting
function can generate our two main empirical regularities.
Suppose a subject has rank dependent utility preferences; that is, she ranks any


















Consider a subject who is indifferent between ($3, 1) and ($4, .8) in the pairwise choice
Q1. Suppose further the subject evaluates her choices in our experiment according
to (1). Take the neo-additive weighting function f (see Wakker, 2010, pages 208-210)
of the form:16
(6) f(p) =
bp if 0 ≤ p < 11 if p = 1
where 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. Normalize u (0) = 0 and u (4) = 1. Risk aversion implies that
u (3) ≥ .75 (Chew, Karni, and Safra, 1987). Then ($3, 1) ∼ ($4, .8) implies that
u (3) = f (0.8) = 0.8b. If b < 1 it follows that ($3, .5) ≺ ($4, .4), and thus the subject
exhibits the certainty effect.17 We will now show that when b < 1, this subject will
switch after line 11 in both lists.
Consider a continuous approximation to the choice lists in which the subject chooses
a switching point from B to A, q1 and q2 in List 1 and List 2 respectively, each
16It is trivial to add a constant a ≥ 0 to the weighting function in order to capture the possibility
effect, and the same results as below hold as long as a+ b < 1 and a+ 0.8b < 0.8.
17Since U (($4, 0.4)) = 0.4b > 0.4b2 = (0.5b) (0.8b) = U (($3, 0.5)).
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of which denote Option B’s probability of not winning on a particular line of the
list.18 Let each line be selected for payment with a uniform probability on [0, .5] in
List 1 and on [.5, .75] in List 2. Choosing q1 induces the reduced lottery Q1 (q1) =
($4, 2q1 − q21; $3, 1− 2q1; $0, q21) so the subject will choose q∗1 to maximize:









)− f (2q1 − q21)]
Substituting the neo-additive weighting function (6), we can derive the optimal
switching point in List 1, which corresponds to q∗1 = 1−u(3).19 From our assumption
of indifference in the pairwise choice Q1, we can rewrite this optimal switching point
as q∗1 = 1−f (.8) = 1− .8b. Since 0 ≤ b < 1 and u (3) ≥ .75, the subject will switch to
the safe outcome between the lines corresponding to losing probabilities of .2 and .25
in the choice list.20 As such, these preferences are consistent with our first empirical
regularity: choosing ($3, 1) over ($4, .8) in the pairwise choice and ($4, .8) on line 11
of List 1. Likewise, the opposite reversal is ruled out: the subject will not choose
($4, .8) over ($3, 1) in the pairwise choice and ($3, 1) on line 11 of List 1.
Similarly, choosing q2 induces the reduced lottery Q2 (q2) =(
$4,−2q22 + 4q2 − 32 ; $3, 32 − 2q2; $0, 1− 2q2 + 2q22
)
. So the subject will choose
q2 to maximize:
U (Q2 (q2)) = f
(







(−2q22 + 2q2)− f (−2q22 + 4q2 − 32
)]
Substituting the neo-additive weighting function (6) and calculating the optimal




. Therefore, the subject will switch at
the same line in List 1 and List 2. These preferences are consistent with our second
18So the probability of winning $4 at the switching point is 1− qi. We use the continuous approxi-
mation for simplicity and have obtained comparable results without this simplification.
19Since utility is discontinuous around certainty in this model, we need to verify that the subject’s
payoff at q∗1 is higher than her payoff of always choosing ($3, 1) when deriving a subject’s optimal
switching point.






















= b+ b (.8b) ((.8b)− 1)
Thus since .75 ≤ .8b ≤ .8,U (Q1 (q∗1)) − U (($3, 1)) = b [.2− (.8b) (1− .8b)] ≥ 0. This rules out the
riskless corner solution.
20By a similar calculation, any subject who chooses the risky option (B) in Q1 will switch after line
11 in List 1, and some subjects who strictly preferred the safe option (A) in the pairwise choice Q1
will switch to the risky option before line 11 when facing List 1.
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empirical regularity: even if a subject exhibits the certainty effect in pairwise choice,
the choices made in the two lists will be consistent with expected utility.
These results can be visualized using Figure 2. The indifference curves of the neo-
additive weighting function are parallel straight lines in the interior of the triangle,
but are discontinuous on its boundary where the probability of earning $0 equals 0
(when b < 1). For a subject indifferent between between ($3, 1) and ($4, .8), the
indifference curves are flatter (their slope equals u(3)
1−u(3)) than the dashed line A1B1,
so the indifference curve passing through B1 approaches the vertical axis above A1.21
Such a subject therefore chooses a switching point on List1 that is to the right of
Line 11. Since the indifference curves in the interior of the triangle are parallel
straight lines, this subject will strictly prefer B2 to A2 in pairwise choice (exhibit the
certainty effect) but will have the same switching point in List 2 as in List 1 (just like
an expected utility subject).
4.3. Alternative explanations and their relation to existing findings. Our
leading explanation for the results reported in this study was initially posited by
Karni and Safra (1987) as a potential explanation for the preference reversal phe-
nomenon. But in contrast to experiments in the preference reversal literature, we
compare behavior in pairwise choice treatments to behavior in identically-framed
pairwise choices contained in a list, thus procedure-based explanations of the pref-
erence reversal phenomenon do not obviously apply to our study. Nonetheless, for
completeness, we review a leading explanation for the preference reversal phenome-
non as well as two potential sources of bias in choice lists and argue that they cannot
explain our findings.
Contingent weighting and scale compatibility. One explanation for preference rever-
sals between pairwise choice and the BDM is that subjects’ preferences depend on
how they are elicited, in violation of the principle of “procedure invariance.” In par-
ticular, Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990) posit that subjects facing a “matching
task” as in the BDM put more weight on the attribute being matched – their “scale
compatibility hypothesis.” Unlike in earlier studies of preference reversals, our paper
compares behavior in pairwise choice treatments to behavior in an identically-framed
pairwise choice contained in a list (not a matching task), so this explanation does not
obviously apply. But if we did treat the list as akin to a BDM-matching task where
subjects match an indifference probability, then the scale compatibility hypothesis
21The limit on the vertical axis equals 0.8(1−b)1−0.8b .
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would predict that subjects would put more weight on the probability dimension
when facing the list. This would generate more risk averse choices in the lists, which
is the opposite of what we find in Q1. Moreover, this hypothesis would apply equally
in choice lists with and without a certain option, while we only find a significant
difference in choices involving certainty.
Middle-switching heuristic. It has been conjectured that when choices are presented
in a list, subjects are biased towards switching at the middle of the list (Andersen,
Harrison, Lau, and Rutström, 2006; Beauchamp, Benjamin, Chabris, and Laibson,
2015). Any subject who switches at the middle of the list would choose the risky
option on line 11, which can qualitatively provide a possible explanation for our
results. To see whether this can quantitatively explain our results, we re-run our
main analysis after discarding the 32 monotone subjects who switched at the middle
of the Q1 list (immediately after line 13), and we find that 39.0% of the remaining 323
subjects picked the risky option on line 11, which is still significantly different from
the 23.5% who chose the risky option in the Q1 pairwise choice treatments (p = .01,
Fisher’s exact test).22 We thus conclude that a middle-switching heuristic cannot
quantitatively explain our results.
Fixed side of the list as a reference point. An alternative explanation is that subjects
facing a list treat the fixed side of the list as a reference point (Sprenger, 2015).
However, if subjects were loss averse and treated the lottery on the fixed side of the
list as the reference point, they would demonstrate more risk aversion in List 1 than
in the pairwise choice Q1 – the opposite of what we observe.
Relation to other existing findings. The renewed interest in empirically evaluating
the incentive compatibility of various payment mechanisms when responding to risk
tasks should be credited to Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2015), who use a between-
subjects design to compare a large number of payment schemes (including RIS) to a
single pairwise choice. In some comparisons, they find significant differences between
behavior in the RIS to behavior in a single pairwise choice. They do not, however,
study choice lists, which are a crucial intermediate case between their design and the
BDM mechanism.23 In another study, Cox, Sadiraj, and Schmidt (2014) demonstrate
22This is an extremely conservative correction, since it also discards subjects who intentionally
switched at line 13.
23Related work by Castillo and Eil (2014) also explores behavior in choice lists by proposing and
testing a model inspired by status-quo bias; however they do not compare behavior in choice lists to
behavior in pairwise choice. Recent work by Brown and Healy (2014) follows up the current study
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that using RIS while including additional comparisons among similar lotteries that
either dominate or are dominated by the original lotteries may affect subjects’ choices.
In the choice list used in the current investigation, we vary only one alternative
(Option B), and include both better and worse lotteries than the lottery included in
line 11. Naturally, this framing may have an effect on choices made in line 11, but we
believe that this is similar in nature to the effect discussed in the “middle-switching”
above – which we showed could not account for our findings.
5. Conclusion
This study documents that embedding a pairwise choice between a sure option and
a risky lottery in a list significantly increases the likelihood that the risky lottery
will be chosen. We demonstrate how this finding could be understood in light of the
interaction between non-expected utility preferences and the RIS (Karni and Safra,
1987).
A typical experiment whose primary goal is to measure preferences at the individual
level must present a subject with a sequence of decision problems. Usually (but not
always) one of them is selected for payment. A core feature of our design is a between-
subject comparison with a group of subjects who make a single pairwise choice. We
believe that this design feature can and should be incorporated into future studies
to evaluate existing or proposed methods for eliciting preferences, especially when
studying choices that involve a certain option.
We found that embedding a choice in a list, incentivized using the RIS, substantially
affected risk-taking when a certain option was available. Since this effect differed
depending on whether a safe option was available, our explanation in terms of an
interaction between the RIS, list presentation, and a certainty effect was the most
natural candidate explanation. Yet we found that the RIS did not lead to different
behavior between our “one task” and “two tasks” pairwise choice treatments – a finding
consistent with most (but not all) of the literature on the RIS that studies a small
number of pairwise choices. We acknowledge that this creates a grey area, as our study
alone cannot provide a clearly delineated set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for when the RIS will affect behavior. We believe that future work could play an
by considering behavior in choice lists that do not involve sure payments, and indeed cannot reject
the incentive compatibility of RIS in a treatment similar to ours. Work in progress by Loomes,
Maadi, and Pogrebna (2015) also compares choices made in choice lists to pairwise choices. In
recent theoretical work, Azrieli, Chambers, and Healy (Forthcoming) generalize Karni and Safra’s
results and study the conditions for the existence of incentive compatible mechanisms for eliciting
preferences.
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important role in exploring this grey area by studying intermediate cases between
our choice lists with RIS treatments and our pairwise choice treatments.
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